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Abstract: This essay looks at the public health consequences of U.S. development aid to both
India and PEPFAR. A close analysis of the U.S.-India development aid relationship presents an
important case study for the purposes of this essay, as it is one of the oldest and longest
development aid stories in U.S. history. The evolution of U.S. development aid is traced
throughout its history with India. In other words, the varying outcomes that occurred as a result
of the presence of paternalism in U.S. development aid are chronologically imprinted in its
development aid relationship with India, an important component when assessing the influence
of U.S. foreign and domestic policy over its development strategies. The case study therefore,
provides critical information that will allow certain assumptions to be made about the future of
PEPFAR as U.S. development aid manifests in a similar pattern to India’s experience. These two
state development aid cases are deemed as success stories, from a U.S. standpoint, which
highlights the external public health outcomes. The parallels that can be drawn between the
paternalistic manifestations in the U.S.-India development aid relationship and PEPFAR
programs currently being implemented in focus countries, are explored in order to try and
understand the future public health outcomes of the PEPFAR program.

Foucault: Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that
things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no
longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.1

Introduction
USAID’s Mission Statement: “We partner to end extreme poverty and to promote
resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity.”2
The means by which development aid has been promulgated is, in a respect, a product of
a market driven society. An overarching theme of U.S. development assistance has been to

1

Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc.,
1988), 155.
https://monoskop.org/images/9/96/Foucault_Michel_Politics_Philosophy_Culture_Interviews_an
d_Other_Writings_1977_1984.pdf.
2
“Mission, Vision and Values,” USAID, accessed October 2016, https://www.usaid.gov/whowe-are/mission-vision-values.
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reduce the vast areas of inequality that are starkly contrasted between developed and
underdeveloped nations, while simultaneously bolstering U.S. economic growth. With this in
mind, it happens that the fundamentals of U.S. development aid are pushing against certain
humanitarian efforts due to its political and economic interests that drive development aid
initiatives. In a case study analyzing the early history of the U.S.-India development aid
relationship, I will explore the apparent disconnect between the determination of the success of
the relationship viewed as such by the U.S. and the public health outcomes that took place as a
result of the Indian 1975 Emergency State. The evidence from the India case study will be used
to critique a present day U.S. development aid project, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR). The events of the India case study provide evidence of the paternalistic nature
of U.S. development aid manifesting in multiple ways. The reasons for why U.S. development
aid in a market society is at odds with public health become apparent once the paternalistic
nature of development aid is explored in both India and PEPFAR.
The first chapter is a discussion on paternalism. Before diving directly into the critique of
paternalism and development aid, a more individualized understanding and definition of
paternalism will be explored. As a large portion of this paper uses historical analysis as a means
to understand current events, the origins of paternalism and its critique of liberty act as a
foundation for the more broad and relevant discussion of paternalism and development aid as it
steps outside of state borders. The argument used to critique the paternalistic nature of U.S.
development aid builds from the contemporary discourse on the role paternalism plays in
development aid today. This chapter serves as a basis from which four specific critiques of U.S.
development aid will be drawn. While the paternalistic nature of the aid lends itself to the overall
argument, particular arguments, drawn from the India case study, act as steps in the evolution of
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development aid initiatives, each furthering the public health consequences of the receiving state.
In order to understand the opposition that development aid creates in response to public health
initiatives, concepts from paternalism theory are discussed. As the political and economic
environment plays a crucial role in the development of India’s family planning program,
paternalism will tie together the four arguments from an overarching vantage point that considers
as many of the contributing factors as possible.
The second chapter contains the case study of India. The historical analysis is used to
understand the motivation behind the 1975 India Emergency state. The history of U.S.
development aid to India contains a variety of initiatives and concepts that were a direct result of
academic and political thinking at the time. The case analysis will be the foundation upon which
the four arguments are referenced. In order to create an accurate and clear picture of this specific
period, the U.S.-Indian relationship will be placed in a larger political context in order to
reference events and connections that influenced the political decisions of both nations. With that
said, the political climate will be analyzed only to the extent that it relates to the U.S.-India
development aid relationship. The chronological order of the case study is used to show the
extent to which U.S. development aid influenced the decisions of the Indian government, and in
particular, the role the U.S. played in influencing India’s coercive sterilization practices. The
purpose of analyzing the initial development aid relationship between the U.S. and India
provides evidence of influence. This level of influence being analyzed is used to decipher the
type of paternalistic relationship that development aid has to public health and how it was
misinterpreted or ignored due to economic and political incentives. The case study shows how
the paternalistic nature of the relationship evolved in different ways, and how its evolution
continually served U.S. goals, which were at odds with the public health of Indian citizens.
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The third chapter will be a deeper discussion and critique of the ways in which U.S.
paternalistic development aid manifestation. Each argument will be discussed as they pertain to
the case study, including the reasoning behind their initiation, execution, and overall result. The
effects of certain development aid strategies highlight a number of developments that were
ignored throughout the relationship for reasons other than benefitting the public health of the
Indian population. This ignorance of effect will be discussed in particular detail as it opposes or
mocks the concept of forward thinking in relation to U.S. development aid. This becomes clear
once understood within the context of U.S. foreign policy goals. There is an undercurrent in each
of the arguments that attempts to address the issue of public health being treated as a commodity.
It analyzes how treating humans as capital or as a means to, interferes with any attempt to
ameliorate public health issues. The arguments, once analyzed through past events, will take
form in the critique of the ongoing public health initiative, PEPFAR. The case study of India and
the U.S. evolves to show how development aid, in its relation to public health, continues to act in
the same way today, creating a cycle of public health initiatives lacking the fundamental element
of foresight, or the foresight directed towards interests unparalleled with public health. The four
arguments propose an alternative to the understanding that U.S. development aid initiatives to
India were not successful and that current public health initiatives are continuing to be subjected
to a system influenced primarily by a U.S. market-based mentality.
The fourth chapter discusses the present U.S. initiative, PEPFAR. PEPFAR was chosen
as a present day critique of U.S. bilateral development aid for several reasons. First, “PEPFAR
[is] the largest bilateral aid program.” Second, PEPFAR was enacted as a five-year strategy, but
has been extended to continue indefinitely. Today, PEPFAR’s strategy is not confined to a time
frame, but rather an open-ended target of delivering “an AIDS-free generation.” PEPFAR is
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therefore a current, evolving, and large targeted public health development issue being
administered by one of the largest bilateral aid donors. It is these components of PEPFAR that
make it an important initiative to critique in light of the history of the U.S.-India development aid
relationship. PEPFAR is an example of the fact that U.S. development aid has not evolved so as
to address public health issues from a sustainable foundation.
Today’s market-based system has struggled to find a solution that alleviates issues of
public health that incorporate state interests when they are addressed using a bilateral strategy.
The history of the India case study is such that the public health outcomes that unfolded can be
directly connected to U.S. development aid. When similar disconnects that were found between
U.S. development aid goals and the public health of Indian citizens were found as well in
PEPFAR, the future public health outcomes of the program underwent analysis. In other words,
the similarities drawn between India and PEPFAR suggest that the future success of the PEPFAR
program does not imply a successful public health initiative.

Chapter 1. Paternalism and Development Aid
Of the multiple ways in which paternalism in U.S. development aid manifests, this essay
draws out four specific criticisms. These four arguments analyze the evolving influence that U.S.
development aid has over recipient countries when it is directed towards public health initiatives.
The paternalistic nature of development aid stems from the theory of paternalism at a more
personal level, as is found in Gerald Dworkin’s essay Paternalism; “By paternalism I shall
understand roughly the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons
referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person
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being coerced.”3 While there are undoubtedly moments in development assistance when an
individual’s liberty is interfered with, the preexisting discourse surrounding the concept of
paternalism and development aid provides a more direct connection to the four arguments. I use
Dworkin’s definition however, as a founding basis for the concept of paternalism as experienced
by an individual, though this essay focuses on the experiences of societies as a whole. The theory
of paternalism and development aid offers a deeper analysis of the relationship between public
health and development aid and offers a conceptual framework from which the four arguments
will draw. Maria Eriksson Baaz, author of The Paternalism of Partnership, argues, “[There] is a
contradiction between the discourse of partnership which emphasizes and denotes equality and
disavows paternalism, and the discourse of (evolutionary) development according to which the
‘partners’ are not equal, but instead are situated at different stages of development and
Enlightenment.”4 The four arguments that are highlighted in this paper were found to evolve in
succession and as such, will be presented in the order in which they occurred. The evolution of
their succession was uncovered in the India case study, and their presence in the PEPFAR
program were therefore critiqued in the same chronological order.
In Paternalism, Dworkin begins his article by examining a quote from John Stuart Mills’
On Liberty; “That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”5 This quote is
pertinent to comprehending how harm to others is calculated or understood in a larger context,
3

Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," the Monist 56 (1972): 65,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902250
4

Maria Eriksson Baaz, “Paternalism: The ‘Outside’ or ‘Rejected Inside’ of Partnership?” The
Global Times 7 (2007): 1, file:///Volumes/Storage/2531-6250-1-SM.PDF.
5
John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty: Introductory,” in On Liberty, (Bedfordshire: AUK Classics,
2011), 26. ProQuest ebrary.
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especially if the harm being referred to is a projected evaluation. This quote touches upon one of
the fundamental components in the justification for why U.S. development aid was used in the
context of India’s family planning programs. In other words, In Mill’s understanding of
paternalism, this form of coercion is his only exemption to his critique of the theory and thus,
presents the case for why the paternalistic nature of U.S. development aid, when directed
towards public health, is being critiqued. This essay is not a critique of paternalism itself; rather,
it analyzes how its undeniable presence in U.S. development aid influences the success of public
health initiatives. The coercive nature of paternalism can take different forms depending on
whom the coercive action is being taken against; “the class of persons whose good is involved is
not always identical with the class of person’s whose freedom is restricted.”6 This form of
paternalism will be explored in both the India case study and PEPFAR, as both cases are
examples of public health initiatives that contain coercive action taken with the benefits of future
generations in mind. Paternalism “will always involve limitation on the liberty of some
individuals in their own interest but it may also extend to interferences with the liberty of parties
whose interests are not in question.”7 The four critiques will explore how in both the U.S.-India
aid relationship and PEPFAR, the paternalistic nature of U.S. aid not only interferes with the
liberty of citizens in receiving states, but that harm is inevitably incurred by citizens of aid
receiving states as well. The case study of India and PEPFAR are examples of public health
initiatives motivated by the understanding that exceedingly worse outcomes would occur if an
alternative response of inaction were taken. The examination of each of the arguments is placed
within the context of the India case study. Once the arguments have been presented and the case
study examined, their presence in the PEPFAR program will be analyzed.
6
7

Dworkin, "Paternalism," 67.
Ibid, 68.
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Chapter 2. The India Case Study
The U.S. State Department created the National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68) in
April 1950, a most concise document outlining the U.S.’s foreign policy strategy.8 The document
states; “For us the role of military power is to serve the national purpose by deterring an attack
upon us while we seek by other means to create an environment in which our free society can
flourish.”9 The 1950’s marked a turn in U.S. strategy as it began to shift its focus away from the
military, though not entirely, and direct its attention towards the development sector.
American foreign policy at this time, and throughout the Cold War, was fixated on
stopping the spread of communism, and conversely promulgating the benefits of democracy. As
the Cold War was much more than just a military battle, it was a battle of ideological differences
and a race to ensure one governmental understanding over another’s. This was a war of
persuasion. The U.S. had to prove that democracy was more sustainable; that it would provide
other governments with economic benefits so as to ensure their citizens a way of life that was
measurably better than the one they were currently experiencing. When, in 1949, the People’s
Republic of China declared victory over America’s ally, Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the
Nationalist Party, the U.S. turned towards India to bolster democratic influence.10 As a newly
independent, heavily populated, democratic nation, India represented the obvious next step in
halting the spread of communism. At the same time though, India was in poor economic
8

“NSC-68, 1950,” Office of the Historian, accessed November 18, 2016,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68
9
“A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68,” The Truman Library, accessed
November 18, 2016,
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf.
10
Warren I. Cohen, “The United States and China during the Cold War,” History Now: The
Journal of the Gilder Lehrman Institute, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-byera/seventies/essays/united-states-and-china-during-cold-war.
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standing, “according to new global measures of gross national product per capita, [India]
contained more than one quarter of the world’s poor.”11 U.S. involvement in Asia did not
decrease with the loss of China, but the loss made the U.S. reevaluate its tactics.
Many U.S. lawmakers and academics attributed the loss of China to communism as a
result of China’s famines. China’s Civil War had been more than a matter of ideological
differences, it was the deciding factor for which of the two political parties, would control and
provide for the people, which of the two parties would end a need for societal uprisings. There
was a debate circulating around Washington, citing that America had spent too much time
focusing on the major cities in China as opposed to its rural population and had lost the
opportunity to show that democracy was not only the most inclusive form of government, but
also the most efficient, in terms of labor production. India, unlike the vast majority of regions the
US was involved in, was not struggling with a major internal military struggle. On the contrary,
India had just experienced a reunification during its fight for independence providing an
opportune moment for the United States to flex its non-military efforts at foreign policy. Indian
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s ruling democratic administration was not seeking military
aid; rather it suffered from economic constriction which shifted the emphasis of U.S. support
from military aid towards the use of economic aid in the fight against communism on the Indian
front.
Before India’s independence in 1947, the events of the Cold War were unearthing the
difficulties that lower economic performing countries were facing with food shortages and

11

Nicole Sackley, “Village Models: Etawah, India, and the Making and Remaking of
Development in the Early Cold War,” Diplomatic History 37 (2013): 765,
http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.ezprox.bard.edu/eds/detail/detail?sid=72d5719c-5399-4b6491dcb9268ea532d0@sessionmgr4005&vid=1&hid=4208&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmU
mc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ==#AN=89866279&db=aph.
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population growth. Theories behind population control grabbed the attention of American
academics and several key figures linking economic development to population control would
figure prominently in the introduction of family planning in Indian policy. The loss of China to
communism was a strong motivator to try and understand the necessary steps in order to control
political revolutions favoring communism; “[Population] growth was understood to lead to
resource shortages, economic stagnation, and political instability: in short, conditions believed
ripe for the spread of communism.”12 When India became independent and U.S. interest shifted
from China to India, there was a general consensus that Indian political stability was imperative
if democracy was to withstand the spread of communism.
One theory in particular that discussed the role and trajectory of population control was
transition theory. Transition theory provided a three-step process by which countries underwent
population surges in relation to industrialization and economic development. In the early 1940s,
a group of demographers at Princeton’s Office of Population Research provided an alternative
view to transition theory, “which reconfigured the theoretical link between population growth
and (under)development.”13 In other words, as opposed to transition theory where population
control happens naturally alongside modernization, the reformulated theory reversed the order,
maintaining that population control was a necessary component for modernization to occur. This
way of thinking about population control and economic development led to the creation of the
Population Council in 1952. Organized by John D. Rockefeller, the Council was a conglomerate

12

Rebecca Jane Williams, “Storming the Citadels of Poverty: Family Planning under the
Emergency in India, 1975-1977,” The Journal of Asian Studies 73 (2014): 479,
doi:10.1017/S0021911813002350.
13
Williams, “Storming the Citadels of Poverty,” 479.
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of “demographers, scientists, academic administrators, and population activists.”14 Among the
demographers was Frank Notestein, a prominent academic who strongly believed that population
growth hindered the economic prospects of a country.
A famine in 1951 brought Prime Minister Nehru, conscious of his country’s hard-won
independence and steadfast in his position of neutrality, to the hard-pressed position of asking
the U.S. for aid. The inadequate Indian food supply was due to flooding in 1948 and severe
droughts in 1950. Fortunately for the U.S., Nehru understood that it was the only country readily
able to provide the necessary resources.15 Even though his options were limited, Nehru asked
that the aid be given as a gift, with no political strings attached, but with little leveraging
capacity, the anti-aid mindsets in Washington had no such intention of giving gifts to the nonaligned and believed-to-be communist leaner. In a statement to Congress in February, Truman
attempted to sway the decision-making process by highlighting India’s struggle as a new
democratic nation; “It is important to the free world that the democratic institutions which are
emerging in India be maintained and strengthened… Its continued stability is essential to the
future of free institutions in Asia.”16
Truman was unable to respond to Nehru’s request for immediate assistance until after
Congress’s approval in March of 1951, five months after Nehru had admitted to needing U.S.
aid. Then, in June of that year, the India Emergency Food Aid Act was signed, authorizing a
$190 million loan. The money would be used to purchase grain for the people of India, an
amount determined by the average food consumption of the Indian population. With no ability to
14

Matthew Connelly, “Population Control in India: Prologue to the Emergency Period,”
Population and Development Review 32 (2006): 633-634. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20058922.
15
McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 90.
16
Harry S. Truman, “Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953,” Special
Message to the Congress on the Famine in India, Harry S. Truman: Library and Museum,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=241&st=development&st1=India.
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negotiate on the terms of the loan, it was given on the condition that India would pay it back
using certain “rare minerals valuable in nuclear weapon production.”17 While there was still
contestation in Congress about the necessity of development aid to India, there was a desperate
undertone by those who believed food instability would weaken the Indian government and
surely, if the U.S. did not step up, communism would.
In the early 1950s, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru disagreed with the
understanding that population control brought about economic development. He believed that
overtime the process of modernity would move the country into a naturally lower growth rate.18
With that said, India’s first five-year plan is evidence of the fact that he felt that family planning
was associated with the welfare of the Indian citizens. Family planning was incorporated into
India’s public health program, but the government prioritized rural development and
industrialization over family planning. Allocating government resources primarily to the latter
two programs was considered as a better investment in India’s future. The funds for the family
planning program were hardly touched as the Ministry of Health made it exceedingly difficult for
states to access the funds in order to set-up their own family planning programs.19 India’s
Minister of Health Rajkumari Amrit Kaur agreed with Nehru that prioritizing economic
development over family planning was correct if economic development would bring about
family planning on its own.
Both Truman and Bowles believed that without a significant increase in U.S. aid, the
First Five-Year Plan would fail and communism would spread over the region. Advocates for aid
to India pushed Congress for an increase, but it was not until 1954 that a steady supply of grain
17

Sackley, “Village Models: Etawah, India, and the Making and Remaking of Development in
the Early Cold War,” 766.
18
Williams, “Storming the Citadels of Poverty,” 480.
19
Connelly, “Population Control in India,” 641.
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was being sent to India. During this time, the U.S. was spending a significant amount of money
on grain storage due to increases in production as a result of its subsidization during World War
II. It was agreed upon that the grain would be sent directly to India, as opposed to working
through a third party, using Public Law (P.L.) 480.20 One senator, Hubert Humphrey, stated that
“[agricultural] excess was an inescapable consequence of American technical proficiency… just
as Asia’s traditional agriculture inevitably entailed shortage.”21 When the farm bill failed that
same year, P.L. 480 provided an answer to both a domestic and international issue. In July 1954,
President Eisenhower signed the Food for Peace Program after the U.S. government agreed to
send grain under P.L. 480.
Using the grain supplied through the Food for Peace Program, the Indian Food Ministry
decided to ensure its distribution by setting up “a network of 50,000 fair-price shops offering
discounted flour… Intended for the poor, [these shops] soon appeared in affluent suburbs.”22
Bread and other wheat products soon became staples in the Indian diet. A range of food products,
that had been previously considered common staples to the Indian diet, fell, as wheat prices were
by far the cheapest commodity. While “[community] development and irrigation increased wheat
acreage… yield per acre [declined] by 12% from 1952-1958 and then stagnated.”23 This problem
of production was the result of farmers losing their incentive to produce unwanted food products,
loss in income from low sales, and sporadic weather that decimated crops. India’s future looked
bleak when U.S. aid was absent from the calculation, but the repercussions of continued aid were

20

Shyam J. Kamath, “Foreign Aid and India: Financing the Leviathan State,” submitted May 6,
1992, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-170.html.
21
Nick Cullather, The Hungry World, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 142.
22
Cullather, Hungry World, 144.
23
Ibid, 144.
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also presenting serious consequences, though in reality, these factors were the ones remaining
absent from any future projections.
Elections in 1957 turned out a win for India’s Communist Party in the southern state of
Kerala. A panic-stricken U.S. decided to increase aid, as the nightmare of a communist India
seemed to be coming to fruition. The United Nations and a select few in Congress maintained
that grain imports were damaging the Indian economy, but the outcome of elections in Kerala
along with the impending gap depicted in the Second Five Year Plan allowed no time for the
negative effects of aid to be considered. In the early months of 1958, the U.S. announced its
emergency aid package to India, totaling to a $225 million loan and increased food supplies
through P.L 480.24 Even after factoring in the resources provided by the emergency aid package,
India continued to project a food shortage. In 1959, the Ford Foundation published a Food Crisis
Report for India, “[forecasting] an impending gap of 28 million tons of grain by 1965… Experts
identified ‘the crux of the problem’ as a gap between food supply and a ‘rapidly increasing
population.”25 Again though, there was little consideration for the possible effects of P.L. 480 or
the idea that high infant and maternal mortality rates would offset the growing population as well
as the death toll that certain diseases contributed to annually. This lack of responsibility on the
part of the U.S. was the catalyst for what was to become India’s dependence on U.S. food aid.
“Just as with calls for a transparent partnership, calls for the need to activate ‘partners’ agency
can be seen as a reflection of a perceived lack – a lack of ‘partner’ responsibility and
commitment.”26

24

McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 239.
Cullather, Hungry World, 154.
26
Baaz, “Paternalism,” 2.
25
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In 1959, along with the projected food shortages, China’s famine had solidified the
argument for agricultural development, family planning, and the continuation of U.S. food
supplies. Congress passed Kennedy’s development plan, officially known as “The Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961,” and while there were a range of ideas and disagreements about what
development in India would look like, there was a general consensus that the reasons for the aid
were necessary in the fight against communism. The Act had four distinct features; “central
planning, human resources (education, health, and family planning), ‘disinterested’ aid without
political strings, and scientific agriculture.”27 This plan was not centered entirely on India, but it
was understood as the guide to how the U.S. would conduct its foreign policy in Asia as a whole,
which greatly depended on how India would fair.

Section I. The Pre Emergency Period
The push for family planning policies changed when the President of the World Bank,
Eugene Black, asked the Princeton academic, Frank Notestein to conduct research on population
control in India and, more specifically, its link to increased economic growth.28 Notestein
declined to write the report, on the principle that not enough research had been conducted to
back the claim. Declining to write the essay, an agreement was made between the World Bank
and Princeton’s Office of Population Research in 1954 that Notestein would oversee the research
being completed at Princeton by the two demographers Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover.29
It was Notestein though, after declining to write for the World Bank, who wrote to Minister of
Health Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, during the early stages of Coale and Hoover’s work, and

27

Ibid, 156.
Williams, “Storming the Citadels of Poverty,” 480.
29
Ibid, 480.
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explained the possible detrimental outcomes for India if population control was not more heavily
advocated for. In 1955, he stated; “To me, it seems clear, that the slower rate of population
growth would assist the program of economic development in achieving its ultimate goals, i.e.,
relief from crushing poverty and sustained additional gains in the health of the population.”30
This swayed Kaur’s opinion and she would later defend the push for family planning in front of
the Central Family Planning Board, stating, “[Population] growth was impeding efforts to
improve the standards of living and needed to be addressed through a national family planning
campaign.”31
Hoover and Coale publish their work in 1958 and the initial reversal of transition theory
was adopted. The book, Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income
Countries ends the initial hesitation of whether population growth could actually hinder
economic development. “The book presented three projections for future per capita adult income
in India under different rates of population growth… The key message was that a reduction in
population growth would produce ‘important economic advantages.”32 With that said, Coale
later wrote in his autobiography that “our conclusion indicated significant prospective economic
progress even with continued high fertility, and significant if somewhat modest additional
progress should fertility be substantially reduced…”33 However, both the Population Council
and Princeton were responsible for ensuring that the book was received by Indian policymakers,
including the prime minister.34 The book became central to India’s shift from promoting
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economic development more broadly, to family planning. New family planning initiatives were
organized with an urgency that was absent prior to the book’s dispersion. Once population
growth was linked to economic stagnation, the Indian government began passing legislation,
almost immediately, pushing states to focus their efforts on the family planning campaign.
1959, Madras was the first of the Indian states to initiate an economic incentive program
that would motivate citizens to undergo contraceptive procedures. “R. Gopalaswami, chief
secretary of Madras, resolved to pay people 30 rupees ($6.30 in 1959 dollars) to undergo
sterilization and to pay ‘motivators’ 15 rupees for each person they delivered to the clinic
door.”35 The state of Madras had set a precedent for the rest of the country. In 1959, India’s
Central Family planning Board went ahead and prepared the country’s medical facilities for the
influx in people seeking family planning procedures. The bolstering of medical facilities began
by “strengthening the staff at 3,000 hospitals and maternity homes… [This enabled] them to
conduct more sterilization operations free of charge while compensating low-income patients for
travel expenses and lost wages.”36 The rate at which India was passing family planning
legislation however was not matched by initiatives to finance larger medical facilities, increase
the number of facilities, or promote education for doctors and nurses.
In 1960, family planning had moved from a small public health initiative to the center of
India’s development plan. India’s third five-year plan provided family planning with “a sixfold
increase in funding and projected a fivefold increase in the number of clinics.”37 The energy
dedicated to family planning created areas of intense pressure, where individuals would undergo
sterilization due to the sheer number of people all receiving the same procedures; “During a five-
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week ‘intensive Family Planning campaign’ in 1960 [in Maharashtra] more than 10,000 men
were vasectomized in camps designed to create a carnival-like atmosphere and maximize group
pressure.”38 Maharashtra received the first family planning award that same year.39 It happened
that sterilizing men became more common than sterilizing women due to the measurable
difference in speed, for a man could become vasectomized was a much quicker process than
sterilizing a woman.40 Even with the addition in the number of clinics, the rate at which men
were becoming sterilized was so high and with the cost to receive the procedure so low,
maintaining standard hygiene standards was difficult to ensure.41 The evidence supporting
population control as not only as effective, but a necessary step towards economic development
was leading India into a massive family planning campaign.
Justification for including family planning in the third five-year plan came from the
literature published by Coale and Hoover. Their projections “for income increase per adult under
current and reduced levels of population growth” were given as official government responses as
to why family planning was given greater priority over the previous rural and economic
development plans.42 The reasoning for reprioritizing India’s goals had not changed, economic
development was still the main impetus and was espoused by the Indian government as such.
The connection between income growth and population control brought an additional 158,000
Indians to be sterilized in 1962; “the Ministry of Health began to encourage the use of mobile
units to reach people institutionalized for tuberculosis, leprosy, and mental illness.”43 There was
a push from all directions to reach new quotas issued by the central government. The national
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goal had been set; by 1972 the birth rate would be reduced by 40 percent; “No government in
since wartime Japan had pursued a population program with specific demographic goals, and this
was the first in history aimed at reducing population growth.”44 This push to reduce population
growth led to several family campaigns for contraceptive procedures for both men and women.
The campaigns varied in severity, but the larger they were the more women and men were
negatively impacted as a result of India’s poorly financed health infrastructure. A 1965-67
program for IUD insertions led to 29 million Indian women receiving IUDs (intrauterine
devices).45 Many of these quick and non-sterile procedures led to pelvic inflammatory disease as
well as other infections that were left untreated as follow-up appointments were uncommon.
Along with the literature provided by Coale and Hoover, the Indian government had
several organizations working in collaboration in an effort to deliver family planning advice for
future initiatives. By 1965, the United States was not the only donor working closely and
providing recommendations to the Indian government on its family planning programs. The
World Bank, the United Nations, and the Ford Foundation each had teams in India working
strictly with policymakers on India’s family planning campaigns.46 One of the most drastic
population control thinkers was Stephen Enke, an economist for the Rand Corporation and
working in India in the 1960s. Enke approached the Ford Foundation with the argument “that
paying poor people to agree to sterilization or insertion of an intrauterine device (IUD) would be
250 times more effective in promoting economic development than other kinds of aid.”47 While
the Ford Foundation did not follow through with Enke’s policy suggestion his work made its
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way into the American government. It was first given to Robert Komer, President Lyndon
Johnson’s future National Security Advisor, which, when the time came, would be given to the
President himself.48 Stephen Enke’s proposal was a direct argument for economic incentives.
The fact that population growth was not only purported to impede economic growth, but that
spending money to incentivize individuals to undergo contraceptive procedures was more
economical.
Leaving out the fact that Enke had applied the negative economic value associated with
children in order to propose a financial rewards system that would justify such coercive
sterilization programs, Komer edited Enke’s economic theory when he spoke with President
Johnson about using U.S. foreign aid as leverage in order to ensure that population control
initiatives were employed in developing countries.49 Just like Coale and Hoover’s work made its
way into Indian policy, Enke’s work can be linked to U.S. foreign policy. After Komer addressed
President Johnson with the possibility of using U.S. aid as leverage, Johnson made two
significant policy announcements in reference to population control. The first happened only two
months after his conversation with Komer; “Johnson publicly declared that less than five dollars
invested in population control was worth a hundred dollars directly invested in economic
growth.”50 The second initiative was directed solely towards India.
Since 1951, the U.S. had provided millions of tons of grain per year to the Indian people.
Johnson took Komer’s advice and announced that every wheat loan to India, from then on,
would have to be approved by Johnson himself. This policy enactment was known as “the short
leash” and was described as trying to ease India off U.S. aid, including India enacting population
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control policies.51 With America attempting to ease India off U.S. wheat, India had little choice,
but to implement policies that would appease the U.S., as well as plan for a future with
significantly less foreign food aid. The U.S. was not India’s only donor attempting to influence
the country’s progress in its domestic family planning programs. Organizations such as USAID,
the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Ford Foundation were also pushing for stricter
initiatives and as they “provided most of India’s annual $1.5 billion aid package” India was
economically bound to heed their advice.52 Winning the election in 1966, this was the political
environment in which Indira Gandhi entered the office of prime minister.
In 1966 the number of IUDs and vasectomies began to drop with a small number of
exceptions. The majority of IUD programs that were emplaced left no financial room for routine
checkups or cleaner facilities. The financial incentives given to physicians were for IUD
insertions only; “the ministry’s method of funding state family planning programs actually
discouraged better care, requiring them to absorb the cost of treating those with
contraindications… out of the three rupees they received for each IUD insertion.”53 Whether due
to the way in which IUD insertions were conducted, the rates at which women were receiving
IUDs dropped significantly in 1966. With less than 50,000 IUD insertions in October 1966, the
national annual IUD target had very little chance of being met at the rate insertions were being
implemented, which seemed to be the same fate for sterilization rates, though these were higher
than IUD rates.54 One of the few exceptions was an IUD program in Punjab. The program
created in Punjab paid, not only motivators of family planning procedures but also acceptors.
The state of Punjab, for example, paid “IUD acceptors, and it achieved 277 percent of its target
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for 1965-1966. Madras instead concentrated on sterilization, with higher incentive payments for
both acceptors and motivators than any other state-and the highest performance per capita.”55
Thus, the creation of a larger scale incentive-based initiative was designed.
At the same time Indira Gandhi took office in 1966, there was a drought brought on by a
dry monsoon season. The drought left over one hundred million people residing in the states of
Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh at risk of famine.56 The authorization of
continued food aid had yet to be affirmed by President Johnson as a result of the new “short
leash” legislation. When the time came for the U.S. to reexamine its wheat loan in light of
India’s drought, President Johnson refused to authorize another wheat loan to India before
speaking directly with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, emphasizing the need for a strong and
direct Indian initiative to address population control. This refusal came at the same time
“Johnson signed a ‘Food for Peace’ act [which required] that a country’s family planning efforts
be taken into account before granting food aid.”57 The leaders met in Washington in 1966,
marking the beginning of U.S. food aid to India being contingent on India creating a policy that
directly addressed the issue of population control. It also marked another level of coerciveness.
While the U.S. used India’s dire need for food to leverage its own desires for population control,
Indira Gandhi enacted similar policies, using the Indian people’s need for nourishment and
finances.
Recognizing the success of the Punjab and Madras state family planning programs the
central government announced increased funds for all state family planning programs in October
of 1966. The central government though, gave states the power to allocate funds where they saw
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fit; “it provided states 11 rupees for every IUD insertion, 30 per vasectomy, and 40 per
tubectomy (later increased to 90 rupees). Out of this sum, states could pay whatever incentives
appeared necessary.”58 The states that were most affected by the drought, Bihar, Rajasthan,
Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, is where India saw dramatic upticks in IUD and sterilization
procedures after monetary incentives were added to the programs. Previously, Bihar had one of
the lowest levels of sterilization and IUD insertion rates, “But in 1966-67, with some people
eating leaves and bark, a total of 97,409 ‘acceptors’ suddenly came forward.”59 The number of
‘acceptors’ increased for many states, not just Bihar, as a result of the famine and increased
economic incentive combination. Some states used the funds provided by the central government
for their family planning initiatives to pay not only “acceptors”, but also “motivators”; “Punjab,
like Uttar Pradesh, enlisted revenue collectors, [who] threatened to punish workers who
underperformed, and paid ‘motivators’ according to the number of people they brought in.”60
States began penalizing families who had three or more children, sometimes two or more
depending on the state. The push for family planning became increasingly more pressurized by
the state and central governments;
At the end of 1966 both Kerala and Mysore had begun denying maternity
leave to government employees with three or more children… [In June 1967]
Maharashtra announced that in 14 months all state employees who elected to have
more than two children would henceforth be denied government scholarships,
grants, loans, and maternity and housing benefits. In a conference of the chief
ministers of Indian states, all but two said they favored mandatory sterilization.61
However, increasing sterilization and IUD insertion rates would again begin to fall by the end of
1967. The fact that these family planning measures most often affected the poorest of India’s
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citizens is critical in understanding the overall product of the population control development
policy. In order to create a successful family planning program, India and its donors, utilized the
desperate conditions of the 1966 drought to press for continued family planning progress.
In 1971, Mrs. Gandhi was re-elected under the campaign slogan garibi hatao, meaning,
“remove poverty”.62 This slogan became the discourse woven into Gandhi’s State of Emergency,
a period of time about to start four years after her 1971 re-election. Several months before the
Emergency, the Central Family Planning Council passed a family planning program in April,
“recommending a reinvigorated family planning program, including an increased financial
outlay, a ‘more scientific’ system of targets, an enhanced scheme of incentives and penalties for
‘indifferent workers’, and extra compensation for ‘acceptors’ of sterilization.”63 Gandhi had tied
her campaign push for poverty eradication to family planning, finding the two intrinsically
woven together. This reinvigorated push for family planning would set the stage for the family
planning experience about to unfold during Indira Gandhi’s Emergency State.

Section II. The Emergency Period
In the mid-twentieth century, academics and politicians were convening to discuss the
intricate relationship that economic development and population control seemed to garner. The
outcome that was the product of these conversations came to life in India, during the Emergency
Period of 1975 to 1977. This period embodies a multiplicity of themes that enveloped the U.S.India development aid relationship. In June 1975, the Allahabad High Court found Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi guilty of electoral fraud. The Court renounced Gandhi’s position and title
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of Prime Minister, but she remained in power for another two years. This verdict, along with the
pressure from the political opposition of Jayaprakash Narayan’s socialist campaign brought
Gandhi only to tighten her hold on her position as Prime Minister. The same month Gandhi was
found guilty, she declared a state of Emergency in June of 1975, which would continue through
to 1977.64 The State of Emergency was labeled and sold as a fight against poverty; “Gandhi and
her Congress Party government vigorously pursued a program of economic development under
the rallying call of garibi hatao (remove poverty).”65 When the State of Emergency was declared
in 1975, population control was already viewed as a critical component to India’s economic
development plan.
In response to the instability of the country, Gandhi’s State of Emergency was followed
by a twenty-point economic plan. This plan described the goals designed to bring India into the
modern era and to rid the country of poverty, an aspect that was understood as hindering the
growth of the nation. Though coercive family planning measures were a large narrative during
the Emergency Era, family planning was not included in Gandhi’s twenty-point plan. Its absence
though, did not mean that the components of the family planning measures were carried out
separately from the federal government; “the link that was understood to exist between
population growth and underdevelopment meant that, when Gandhi’s rhetoric turned to
economic development in 1975, family planning was also brought center stage.”66 This rhetoric
seeped into the twenty-point plan, and the pursuit of population control through family planning
initiatives fell directly under Gandhi’s understanding of economic development.
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As was seen in April with the strengthening of the role of the Central Family
Planning Council, the government allocated more funds and support to the national family
planning program, two months after initially bolstering the Central Family Planning
Council, during the declaration of the twenty-point plan.67 During the Emergency Period
and earlier, the federal government provided budgets and requirements for each state,
making room for the states to choose the means by which those funds were spent or how
the goals would be achieved. Once Gandhi had strengthened the abilities of the national
family planning program, states handled the initiatives with varying degrees of vigour; “In
some states, police were involved in ‘motivating’ men to ‘accept’ vasectomy; government
servants were given quotas of people to ‘motivate’ for sterilization and, in many cases,
were themselves required to produce sterilization certificates.”68 By giving states the power
to decide for themselves how family planning policies would be carried out, the central
government had created a sense of competition as well as a reward system for the states.
The fact that it was not explicitly mentioned in Gandhi’s twenty-point plan was due
to the overwhelming importance of family planning and if the plan was to reduce the
amount of poverty laden throughout India, then family planning would be one of the most
important tools to do so. Singh, a strong believer in the link between the reduction in
poverty and family planning, stated, “family planning had been omitted from the twentypoint program ‘not because it was unimportant’ but because it was ‘too important to be
listed as one of the points.”69 Singh himself would be a proponent of forced sterilization,
believing that the Indian population was increasing too rapidly to wait for citizens to make
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the choice themselves. Singh’s opinion was made clear when in October 1975, he wrote to
Gandhi explaining the importance of the Crash Programme.70
Following the initiation of the Crash Programme, Gandhi gave a speech in January
1976 at a joint conference of the Association of Physicians of India, and announced her
decision to push for compulsory family planning practices. She stated, “We must now act
decisively and bring down the birth rate speedily… We should not hesitate to take steps
which might be described as drastic. Some personal rights have to be kept in abeyance, for
the human right of the nation, the right to live, the right to progress.”71 Here, Gandhi is
making a direct connection between the need for ‘drastic’ family planning initiatives and
the ability of the country to progress. The fact that individual rights would be subsided
becomes denoted as a necessary step in bettering the lives of the entire population, though
the majority of those who will undergo compulsory procedures are the same individuals
who would be more susceptible to economic incentives. Gandhi’s argument that family
planning would help to rid India of the poverty that continually held it back would morph
into a program designed to rid India of its impoverished, pitting disaster on an entire group
of peoples instead of their economic state.
One month after Gandhi’s speech, Sanjay Gandhi, Indira’s son, declared his own
four-point program. Sanjay’s program did include family planning, and though
constitutionally he had no political power, the program’s acceptance by the Congress Party
was a testament to Indira Gandhi’s influence and increased power since the State of
Emergency. Sanjay’s four-point, and later five-point, program is also historically
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noteworthy due to his own political influence. The influence given to him by his mother
was the only legitimacy granting him political clout, but Sanjay’s position in Indian politics
was not insignificant by any means. Sanjay began acting in Mrs. Gandhi’s stead, when she
would refer “callers on a wide range of issues to Sanjay.”72 As such, Sanjay was seen as a
representative of Gandhi herself. This position granted his views on family planning much
more power, leading him to play an important role in the intensity of the Emergency Era;
“Such behavior constituted a vastly greater emphasis on family planning than ever before
demonstrated by a top-level political leader, and it came at a time when the concerns of
India’s top-level political leadership carried vastly more weight than ever before.”73 The
acceptance of Sanjay’s unofficial four-point program was an event that would foreshadow
his involvement in India’s family planning campaign.
The desire for faster family planning results brought the Indian government to increase
incentivization. In February, states were awarded a whole range of ‘prizes’ to ensure their
residents were continually seeking family planning procedures; “Prizes ranged from trophies to
cash prizes of up to 5,000 rupees. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Health also asked chief
ministers to take disciplinary action against government staff who were not pulling their
weight.”74 The fact that the majority of these states were lacking in personnel and facilities only
increased pressure on the health systems, especially for the poorer states where facilities were
exceedingly rare. In states like Uttar Pradesh, one of the poorest states, performance levels
soared as targets were reached and states were awarded accordingly.

72

Davidson R. Gwatkin, “Political Will and Family Planning: The Implications of India’s
Emergency Experience,” Population and Development Review 5 (1979): 35,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1972317.
73
Gwatkin, “Political Will and Family Planning,” 35.
74
Williams, “Storming the Citadels of Poverty,” 484.

32
The progress shown after February’s award system was emplaced, incentivization to meet
family planning quotas was reintroduced as a main component to the National Population Policy
(NPP), passed in April 1976 by India’s Minister of Health and Family Planning, Karan Singh.75
The program, while increasing family planning quotas, also provided states with complete
control of their family planning policies as long as they continued to meet the targets issued by
the central government. States were allotted contraceptive targets by the Central Ministry of
Health and Family Planning depending on “population size, social and economic situation, and
previous family planning performance.”76 Although the desired targets of the central government
were already steep, “a number of states increased incentives and targets even beyond those
announced by Singh. The NPP also allowed states to pass compulsory sterilization legislation.”77
The monetary incentives issued to the states led to a variety of legislation, each varying in degree
of harshness:
Madhya Pradesh’s granting of irrigation water at subsidized rates to all
persons from villages producing specified numbers of sterilization patients…
Some ordered government servants themselves to be sterilized or lose certain
benefits (Uttar Pradesh’s order to teachers to be sterilized or forfeit a month’s
salary)... others instructed government employees to have others sterilized or face
penalties (Uttar Pradesh’s decision to withhold the pay of family planning and
health department workers who failed to produce the specified number of
acceptors).78
With the NPP being directed towards the states, the Ministry of Health announced that
the central government would follow suit, and set an example for the rest of the country. In
November 1976, central government employees “were told to ensure that they had no more than
three children after September 1977 or face the loss of maternity leave, accommodation and
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allowances that would only be restored upon production of a sterilization certificate.”79 The
states that had the highest rates of sterilization, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and Madhya
Pradesh, surrounded the Union Territory of Delhi, “whose government was essentially taken
over directly by Sanjay Gandhi during the emergency… [With Delhi itself having] the highest
reported sterilization performance of any state or territory.”80 The closer in political and cultural
ties a state had to the central government, the higher the sterilization rates were. While Sanjay
Gandhi drive for family planning was markedly more vigorous than his peers, the country as a
whole experienced the central government’s urge to eradicate poverty with the understanding
that modernization and progress for the country would follow suit.
In comparison to the initial sterilization targets issued in 1976, many states had surpassed
their targets by early 1977, some by 200 percent.81 Officially, the national sterilization target or
goal was roughly 4.3 million acceptors. “All but three of India’s major states (the exceptions
being Assam, Kerala, and Jammu, and Kashmir) raised their targets. These self-proclaimed
targets totaled over 8.8 million, twice the central ministry’s original figure.”82 The drive to
perform above and beyond the calculated quotas was due to the aforementioned incentives, both
at the individual level as acceptors of different forms contraceptive procedures and at the state
level. The cash incentives, forced sterilization, and for the states closest sharing political and
cultural ties, such as the three best performing states surrounding Delhi, each provided their own
motivation for the successes of the family planning initiatives.
Statistics provided by the Indian government show that during the Emergency an
estimated “8.25 million people were sterilized during 1976-1977, around 6.5 million of them
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during the six months of July-December 1976.”83 The government had pushed for family
planning more than any other program that had been determined as important in Mrs. Gandhi’s
platform of ridding the country of poverty and bringing progress to the nation. The Emergency
Era, particularly the July-December 1976 period, saw the largest increase in the number of
sterilizations performed; “the 1976-1977 performance increased the number of sterilized people
by more than half relative to what had been accomplished during the previous quartercentury.”84
In January 1977, Indira Gandhi called for an election, subsequently ending the State of
Emergency. Before the election, Mrs. Gandhi retracted the strict censorship laws she had
emplaced at the beginning of the Emergency. After lifting of the press censorship ban, news
outlets reported on the impacts of the harsh family planning programs; “press reports abounded
of what came to be termed the ‘excesses’ of the Emergency.”85 Increased disdain for Indira
Gandhi’s family planning policies, as well as the restriction of many other freedoms, led the
Congress Party on a campaign overhaul in an attempt to reframe the discourse around Indira’s
State of Emergency. The Party repeatedly professed that the family planning campaign was of a
voluntary nature. The campaign was unsuccessful however, and Gandhi lost the election in
March. The election showed where her biggest adversaries resided, losing heavily in the states
where the “family planning program was pushed most aggressively; and a clear inverse
relationship exists between interstate family planning performance and the Congress Party’s
electoral fortunes.”86 The coercive nature of family planning initiatives during the Emergency is
indisputable. Many citizens of India had had their civil liberties and personal freedoms
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threatened as a way to increase the number of sterilization procedures, an experience that lacked
a feeling of volunteerism; “the available evidence suggests strongly that the frequency of
indisputably coercive practices significantly exceeded the ‘isolated incident.”87 Though the states
closest to New Delhi experienced the highest rates of sterilization the country as a whole felt the
coercive nature of the Emergency Era’s family planning campaign.
This in-depth analysis of the Indian Emergency period is an exploration of the links
between the policies of the U.S. government and the policies of the Indian government.
Population control was, by every means, an issue attempting to be controlled by the largest
international institutions. While the intentions of the U.S., India, and the institutions involved
were not explicitly acting to harm the Indian people, short sightedness is not a claim by which
any government, group, or individual has the right to hide behind. The U.S. government played a
strong role in the sterilization of millions of people, and importantly, a large majority of India’s
citizens lost faith in state provided healthcare. This is an issue that health organizations are
dealing with to this day. That while many believed population control was for the benefit of the
majority, it was disastrous for millions of Indians.

Chapter 3. The Four Arguments
The first argument to be uncovered as result of U.S. paternalistic development aid to
India focuses on the political and economic domestic interests that are systematically applied to
U.S. development aid. The USAID mission statement, quoted at the very onset, serves as a
reminder of the attitude states have towards development aid; that it is an extension of U.S.
foreign policy. Development aid has proven to be largely driven by the interests of donor states
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and as such a certain amount of forward thinking is required when deciding on a development
aid project, but the large majority of that forward thinking is often centered on the donor state
and not the state receiving the aid. This critique of U.S. political and economic interests
examines the history behind the aid, looking at the type of political and social environment that
surrounded the decision makers of the aid at that time.
“[Structured] paternalism aims to nudge citizens toward choice sets that will promote
their well-being while discouraging them from choices that will disastrously undermine it.”88
This argument finds that the paternalistic nature of U.S. development aid combined with the
motivation of U.S. political and economic interests attempts to merge the idea of promoting the
well-being of individuals of a recipient state while ensuring U.S. interests. The India case study
shows that U.S. interests trumped the welfare of Indian citizens demonstrating an ineffectual
merge with the development aid. Family planning was purported as a critical step in the
development process of India’s economy. In the case of India, one group of people in particular
was subject to the coercive component of the family planning initiatives more so than others due
to their socioeconomic class. This first argument is where the coercive nature of the development
aid originates. In terms of population control, Indian citizens were subjects of coercive family
planning procedures due to inaccurate predictions and portrayals of the Indian political, social,
and economic environment. The justification behind the falsified economic development reports
stems from the domestic interests that fueled U.S. development aid to India.
The case study of India shows how U.S. development aid was not solely focused on
bolstering the abilities of India to tackle its own public health issues and that U.S. domestic
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interests played a large role in the issuing of aid. The U.S. government was incentivized by the
prospect of enriching its own political and economic standing by using its own products,
companies, and theoretical concepts when electing to partake in or initiate any type of
development aid to India. The impact this had on the health of Indian citizens receiving the aid
varied. The varying degrees in health outcomes will be discussed at greater length, but in many
cases, it was the socioeconomic status and geographic location that determined an individual’s
health outcome. For the U.S., exporting wheat to India was seen as beneficial. In fact, shipping
wheat in the form of aid solved an expensive issue the U.S. was experiencing with storing excess
grain and thus food aid to India opened an economic channel in the form of aid while
simultaneously providing the desired political security in India. This initial aid package was void
of a critical analysis of whether wheat exports to India would have negative consequences for the
Indian population in the long run. The India case study presents the issue of U.S. development
aid being destructive to a population when the aid is of higher value to the donor country. The
political and economic interests of the U.S. overshadowed the needs of the Indian population and
were instead examined most prominently through the lens of U.S. interests.
This second argument finds that state development aid deepens dependency in the health
sector of the receiving state. The paternalistic nature of the relationship between the donor and
receiver evolves in such a way that development aid agitates health problems. This issue of
dependency follows as a result of the previous critique, that state development aid is not solely
focused on the health issues of a particular population. If political and economic reasoning
dictates where and how aid is distributed then the health issue, by the very nature of the aid,
becomes secondary to the interests of the donor state. This propels the receiving state into a
dependent relationship with the aid. The deepening of dependency detracts from the institutional
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issues that perpetuate health problems and washes over the deeper historical factors, allowing
them to continue without an in-depth, sustainable response. In India, U.S. food aid became
crucial to the survival of the Indian population and, if taken away, risked the lives of that many
more people it was designed to assist. The U.S. had complete control in the development aid
relationship, leaving India at the will of the U.S. Due to the nature of dependency; the U.S. was
able to leverage the wheat and pushed for stricter Indian family planning. This dependent
relationship places the donor state in a position of power over the receiving state, allowing for
coercive agreements to begin formulating, if the coercion was not already present at the time of
the initial aid agreement.
When the U.S. issued the first wheat loans to the Indian government, a Congress
pressured to bolster India’s political strength in an attempt to maintain a strong democratic
presence in the region. Maintaining a democratic majority in India was key to the success of the
Cold War, and as a result, the wheat loans acted as an insurance policy. From the Indian
perspective, India’s dependence on U.S. wheat loans was a result of shortsightedness. The fact
that India developed a dependent relationship with U.S. imported grain seems a transparent fact
in retrospect, but obvious or not, the U.S. was able to maintain the upper hand throughout the
relationship due in part, to India’s dependency, a dangerous position for India’s public health
sector; “If people pay too little attention to the long term, and enjoy short-term benefits at the
expense of significant long-term costs, then a concern for people’s welfare might require, rather
than forbid, certain forms of paternalism (potentially including hard forms).”89 As was found in
the case study, India’s population became dependent on U.S. wheat, a product that was
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unaccounted for when India was projected to have large and devastating food shortages. These
projections created a cycle of increased wheat loans, deepening India’s dependence, and,
eventually, coercive family planning programs.
Dependency forms when, as opposed to applying the developmental issue to a domestic
cause and then centering the aid on that, aid is imported. Aid that is imported is not only
referring to a tangible product, but conceptually as well. Ideas and theories are also applicable,
and can be thrust upon a population in the form of developmental theory. In the case of many
public health initiatives, populations become dependent on products that are provided by the
donor state. Such aid is provided in the first place as a result of the receiving state being unable
to produce or procure a necessary amount to sustain or support their population through non-aid
channels. The importation of the good is then continued out of necessity and the structural
weaknesses of the receiving state are ignored and surpassed by the dominance of the donor state.
India became highly dependent on U.S. food, slowing down India’s progress towards selfsufficiency. Though this relationship was mutually dependent, the success of the development
aid initiative was determined not by both parties, but by the U.S. Democracy in India was a high
priority for the U.S., a foreign policy focus that remained so throughout the Cold War. The
dependency also detracts from the receiving state’s ability to invest in its own infrastructure,
which can cause the deterioration of medical facilities or the stalling of their creation.
The third argument is born from the idea that development aid dictates the demands of a
population. These demands implicate the health of a state’s population in a multitude of ways. In
India, both development theory as well as tangible imported aid resulted in dictating the demands
of India’s development aid needs. A state that receives development aid is importing a resource
that would otherwise be significantly less abundant or completely absent from that society. The
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aid causes a shift in the demand and therefore a shift in the future projections of a society’s
demands. The goals of a development aid initiative are the reason for this shift. The steady flow
of U.S. food aid was issued due to the short term interests of the U.S., but with little
consideration for the long-term effects on the health outcomes it would have on India’s
population. The unsustainable reality of development aid leads a receiving state to reassess its
priorities in terms of providing for its people, basing its own capacity on that of the donor state.
U.S. development theory dictated how the Indian government understood the development of its
own society. It created a sense of urgency that ushered in drastic demands by the Indian
government for increased sterilization efforts. This effect that development aid can have on a
receiving state, implicates many different aspects of a society’s health, ranging from government
initiatives to address issues that will occur as a result of new demands or preparing for huge gaps
in the public health sector as development aid decreases.
When the natural measurement of a population’s consumption is interrupted, projected
plans for improvement shift in response to the introduction of the aid. They can also shift in
response to what a donor state deems beneficial to a society. This can take form in the
introduction of new public health policies or governance that has been shaped by outside
concepts. Shifting demands can also cause governments to enact policies out of fear that their
domestic products and services cannot cope with the shift in demand without the supply of
development aid. This reassessment of a society’s demands comes at a cost, particularly for the
health of the citizens belonging to such a society. The shifting demands, caused by development
aid, prompt a population to consume a product originally absent or scarce, which can have major
consequences on the health of a population. The most dependent and vulnerable individuals in a
society will also be hurt the most by the imposition of an imported product, or development
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theory. As in the case of India, those on the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum were most
likely to participate in cash-incentivized sterilization procedures. If aid is cut off, the natural
demand will take time to shift back to equilibrium, and again those most vulnerable in a society
will experience the harshest consequences.
The fourth argument finds that development aid causes externalities to occur that are
equated as disconnected or unrelated, or never even accounted for, from the aid. The introduction
of a new product or concept into a market can alter the way a market or society functions. In this
sense, development aid acts in a monopolistic manner. Foreign imports can upset the demand
and production of products that were determined based on their consumption prior to the
introduction of the aid. This argument goes back to the fundamental understanding that
development aid works within the constructs of a market-based society. This argument critiques
the fact that even though development aid may change the demands of a population and upset the
original constructs of a system, the aid will continue to be provided so long as it benefits the
donor state. In other words, there will be no direct connection drawn between the skewed order
of the system and the exposure of the state development aid. In this sense, demand, demand for
economic development, becomes the sole context from which importation of development aid is
determined. This critique was formed after exploring the results of India’s sterilization efforts.
After understanding the extent to which the three previous arguments effected Indian public
health policy, it was found that there were health outcomes due to such policies that were absent
from the determined success of the aid relationship. These outcomes are considered externalities
due to their relation to the U.S. development aid programs. With Indian family planning at the
forefront of U.S. development aid policy goals, the history of Indian sterilization programs
suggests success in light of these goals. In other words, the policy agenda of U.S. aid programs
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to India at the time of the case study were deemed as successful, from a U.S. standpoint,
regardless of the resulting public health effects.

Chapter 4. PEPFAR
This section analyzes how the four paternalist critiques of U.S. development aid, birthed
from the U.S.-India development aid relationship, have also taken form in one particular present
day case of U.S. development assistance for HIV/AIDS. According to the World Health
Organization, from 2002 to 2010, the U.S. was the largest contributor to public health initiatives
worldwide. While many other nations provide funding for global public health, the fact that the
U.S. is the largest of those donors makes for a substantial amount of data and research. The
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), is the “largest by any nation to combat
a single disease internationally.”90 In order to make comparisons between India and PEPFAR,
the size of PEPFAR plays an important role in being able to analyze the program using the four
arguments outlined in the India case study. It is also necessary to use a current U.S. bilateral
global public health initiative in order to try and understand the future role of PEPFAR. Notably,
the U.S. was recognized as the largest aid contributor to public health during the time that
PEPFAR was enacted. President George W. Bush garnered support from both democrats and
republicans to pass the act in 2003. In 2003 the initiative was signed into law “by the United
States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25).”91 A
$15 billion budget was allocated for the 5-year initiative. The funding was directed towards “15
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hard hit ‘focus countries,’ and multilateral contributions [were made] to the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (The Global Fund) as well as UNAIDS.”92 12 of the focus
countries are in sub-Saharan Africa, and also include Guyana, Haiti, and Vietnam.93 The public
health goals of PEPFAR are continuously changing as the program goes through reauthorization
(there are now 36 countries and regions with PEPFAR programs).94 Due to this fact, the impacts
of PEPFAR will be critiqued as recently as evidence allows. With that said, the program’s
pledged continuation, signed by President Obama in 2013, place the initiative in a critical time
period for analysis of bilateral state development aid and its effects on public health to be
understood within a present day context.95
PEPFAR is also significant, for the purposes of this essay, due to its esteemed regard.
The legacy of President George W. Bush is often portrayed as bleak and unpopular, with the
exception of PEPFAR.96 When PEPFAR is espoused as a success it is in relation to how the
program has reached its intended goals. As shown throughout the case study of India, U.S.
interests adjust and evolve with the changing domestic and international political and economic
environment. With that said, the overarching goals of U.S. development assistance have
remained the same; to “[further] America’s foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and
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free markets…”97 As a U.S. development aid program, PEPFAR shares in these goals, but the
program itself has a much more specific strategy catered towards fighting the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. Interestingly, the initial sub-Saharan African countries chosen to receive PEPFAR
funds were “significantly more democratic on average compared to non-focus [sub-Saharan
African] countries.”98
The case study of India demonstrated that U.S. development aid programs were
successful in that India created strict family planning programs. Though these programs were
harmful towards Indian citizens, by definition, the U.S. development aid program succeeded in
influencing Indian public health policy nonetheless. As far as recent history shows, PEPFAR is
successful in reaching certain program goals; “As of September 30, 2015, PEPFAR is supporting
life-saving antiretroviral treatment for 9.5 million people.”99 This last chapter explores how these
successes do not refer to the program success as a whole and in fact, have hindered the public
health structures within target countries. PEPFAR’s ongoing status makes it so that examples
from past U.S. development aid programs will be used to try and understand the future
implications of the program. The case study on India was longitudinal which allowed for a
complete analysis of the relationship between U.S. aid to India during the period of time outlined
in the case study. This important aspect of the India case study allows for parallels to be drawn
from the initial stages of both India and PEPFAR. With these parallels, projections can be made
about the future of PEPFAR, given its current trajectory. Unlike the India case study however,
there are many ongoing PEPFAR programs in multiple countries and while each case will have
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its own catered response to the programs this analysis will critique the strategy of the initiative as
a whole using evidence from a variety of programs.
Whether PEPFAR will follow in the same path, as India is dependent on four questions
raised by the four arguments: First, is PEPFAR of greater value to the U.S. than to those
receiving PEPFAR funds? Second, is PEPFAR causing the health systems in focus countries to
weaken? Third, have shifting demands in focus countries prompted populations to consume
something that was limited or absent prior to PEPFAR and has this caused negative health
outcomes? And lastly, can the success of PEPFAR for the United States be attributed to the
success of the program as a whole?
“Above all, a cultural analysis is not the same as a culturalist analysis, which ignores
political and economic contexts.”100 These political and economic contexts are never absent from
U.S. development aid, as demonstrated in both India and PEPFAR. In order to satisfy this first
question of who is benefitting more so from a particular development initiative the interests of
the recipient state are just as vital in order to minimize the health consequences of the citizens of
a recipient state. There are two angles from which U.S. domestic interests should be analyzed in
the case of PEPFAR. The case study of India suggests that both foreign and domestic interests
are applied to U.S. development aid initiatives and implementation. In 2001, the Central
Intelligence Agency “warned that AIDS in China, India and Russia, as well as in Africa, is a
national security threat to the United States.”101 Just as political instability in India during the
Cold War represented a security threat to democracy, AIDS is and was understood as “a national
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security threat that could breed the next generation of terrorists.”102 This was the political
environment from which PEPFAR was born. The U.S. Department of Defense committed its
services to PEPFAR, stating that PEPFAR’s “HIV/AIDS interventions would ‘provide goodwill
humanitarian aid capable of countering terrorist recruitment efforts.”103 Not even two years after
9/11, the idea that AIDS could foster a potential breeding ground for terrorist activity was
undoubtedly a motivating factor for the largest disease targeted initiative. While PEPFAR
presents itself as a development aid program responding to a U.S. national security issue the
program was also implemented with domestic political goals in mind.
When PEPFAR was enacted there were stipulations attached in order to further U.S.
domestic interests in terms of family planning education. This will be the first aspect of PEPFAR
to undergo analysis in terms of domestic interests harming the citizens of states receiving public
health assistance. The PEPFAR report contains a detailed set of guidelines, goals, and funding
conditions. The report contains an approach entitled ABC Guidance (Abstinence, Be Faithful,
and correct and consistent Condom use).104 “Beginning in 2006, PEPFAR specified that 33% of
all prevention (and two thirds of funds for sexual transmission) would be earmarked for AUM
[Abstinence-until-marriage] programmes.”105 While AUM is no longer advocated for with such
ferocity as in the initial stages of PEPFAR, the specificity of the AUM portion of the ABC
approach can be found on the PEPFAR webpage. One section in particular highlights the
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disproportionate weight the AUM and Be Faithful approaches were given over the correct and
consistent Condom use approach;
Young people who have not had their sexual debut must be encouraged to
practice abstinence until they have established a lifetime monogamous relationship. For
those youth who have initiated sexual activity, returning to abstinence must be a primary
message of prevention programs. Implementing partners must take great care not to give
a conflicting message with regard to abstinence by confusing abstinence messages with
condom marketing campaigns that appear to encourage sexual activity or appear to
present abstinence and condom use as equally viable, alternative choices.106
Initially, the AUM approach was highly prioritized in order to gain domestic support and
funding.107 The fact that AUM was often the sole educational approach when informing children
and young adults about HIV prevention was not only ineffectual, it was counterproductive. AUM
policy requirement represents a level of implementation failure that was ignored for political
reasons. According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention the Community Preventive
Services Task Force found “insufficient evidence to determine the effectiveness of group-based
abstinence education interventions delivered to adolescents to prevent pregnancy, HIV and other
sexually transmitted infections (STIs).”108 In 2015, a study conducted by a Stanford medical
student found that; “Nearly US$1.3 billion spent on US-funded programmes to promote
abstinence and faithfulness in sub-Saharan Africa had no significant impact on sexual behavior
in 14 countries in sub-Saharan Africa…”109
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“Globally, young people ages 15-24 represent about 40% of all new cases of human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) among persons 15-49.”110 With this in mind, a large portion of
young individuals in PEPFAR countries were receiving an incomplete education that was
drastically increasing their risks of contracting HIV as proper condom use was not taught in
certain AUM-only programs. Along with the negative impact of the AUM programs, two more
PEPFAR regulations failed to reach a highly marginalized group of people. These were
individuals considered at high risk for contracting HIV; “specific groups of youth are often at
increased risk, including young people engaged in sex work; young men who have sex with men;
and intravenous drug users.”111 When PEPFAR was first enacted it prohibited NGOs from
issuing PEPFAR funded treatment to sex workers. As of June of 2013, in USAID vs. Alliance for
Open Society International (AOSI) the Supreme Court deemed the requirement in violation of
the First Amendment.112 Though the U.S. government is banned from selectively excluding sex
workers from receiving treatment, many individuals ranging in ages, were denied and
stigmatized by the program. While sex workers are no longer excluded from treatment funded by
PEPFAR, the program excludes individuals who may be involved in the latter high risk behavior.
PEPFAR contains a “conscience clause” that “[exempts] faith-based groups and other
organizations from engaging in activities that they deem morally objectionable.”113 “PEPFAR’s
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‘conscience clause’ allows organizations with a moral or religious objection to opt out of
providing services to patients with a sexual orientation of which they disapprove.”114
The countries that receive PEPFAR aid have all had a long history of receiving
development aid. PEPFAR differentiates itself from former aid relationship for two reasons. The
first, as stated earlier, is the fact that PEPFAR funding is allocated unilaterally.115 The second
aspect is that PEPFAR is the largest targeted public health initiative of its kind. Combined, these
two components of PEPFAR have deepened the dependency relationship between PEPFAR
receiving states and the U.S. development aid. As such, the amount of funds and resources that
have been imported into the health sectors of countries that receive PEPFAR aid will be
extremely difficult, if not impossible for those governments to replicate if aid was discontinued;
“PEPFAR aid is also large in magnitude relative to the size of the recipient countries’ health
sector budgets, sometimes accounting for more than the total amount of government health
spending.”116 Due to the nature of PEPFAR funding, it does not appear within the budgets of
recipient countries, which makes it that much more difficult for countries to even attempt to
budget for increased HIV resources; “In 2008, for example, PEPFAR accounted for 118% of the
total government health budget in Ethiopia, 128% in Rwanda, 155% in Kenya, 234% in
Mozambique, and 249% in Uganda.”117 As opposed to strengthening the health systems of focus
countries, PEPFAR has created a series of separate systems entirely dedicated to HIV/AIDS.
These systems are implemented at the expense of the autonomy of PEPFAR recipient states, for
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these governments, with the exception of South Africa, are provided with little negotiation
powers when it comes to PEPFAR policy requirements.118
Such large targeted aid packages can also take a toll on the health systems of receiving
states. With such a narrow focus on one disease, as opposed to health systems as a whole,
resources are funneled away, slowing the process for these countries to create stronger
independent systems. Instead, while HIV/AIDS continues to receive vast quantities of attention
and funding, receiving nations are placed in a seemingly never-ending cycle of requiring aid as a
result of weak health systems. In other words, because other conditions and diseases are
receiving less funding and resources the percentage of the population with such diseases may
increase. These countries will then, due to their underfunded health system, continuously need
aid to combat each targeted disease; “Funneling large sums of external funding to a handful of
high-profile disease risks neglecting not only other diseases, but also state health systems as a
whole.”119 While fears of corrupt governments deters development aid donors from directly
channeling funds into strengthening the health systems of receiving states, PEPFAR is an
imported and temporary response that has bolstered the dependent relationship between
development aid and the health systems of receiving states.
There are certain components to PEPFAR that have allowed the U.S. to dictate the
demands of PEPFAR nations. In terms of prevention policy implementation, PEPFAR “[marked]
out a series of populations in need or at risk, and sought to manage their exposure to HIV by
intervening ‘in their relationships with things like customs, habits, ways of acting and
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thinking.”120 While this aspect of PEPFAR originates from the theoretical components that
determine U.S. interests, such as AUM programs, this attempt at ‘reeducation’ is an example of
an implementation failure as a result of U.S. interests. PEPFAR has drawn a lot of focus and
resources from these focus countries as well as other donors; “HIV/AIDS prevalence in Uganda
stands at 7.3%, while the under-5 mortality rate is 90 deaths per 1,000 births… Malaria is
responsible for over 30% of all child deaths, while HIV/AIDS is responsible for 6%.”121 Yet, the
majority of development funding, and half of Uganda’s health budget in particular, is allocated
towards HIV prevention and treatment.122 The overarching goals of PEPFAR are not specific to
any one country, yet the international and domestic attention that has been brought to the HIV
epidemics in each focus country has pressured these governments into allocating their own
scarce resources towards HIV/AIDS.
Before the U.S. proposal of PEPFAR, there was a call from the international community
to act through multilateral channels to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic; “In the spring of 2001,
UN secretary-general Kofi Annan put new pressure on world governments by proposing the
creation of a Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.”123 The U.S. agreed to help
support the Global Fund, but pushed for effective prevention rather than treatment programs. The
funds provided by the U.S. were minimal in comparison to what it was about to pledge to
PEPFAR. The reasons behind why the U.S. was first adamant about prevention programs over
treatment initiatives are unclear, but once PEPFAR was enacted the emphasis turned to
treatment. This major shift in approach to the HIV/AIDS epidemic is indicative of a donor
country’s ability to dictate how a public health issue should be carried out. Not only did
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PEPFAR demonstrate the shifting of the U.S. approach, it required that all medication used in
PEPFAR programs be name-brand; “President Bush did maintain a Clinton-era policy that
allowed companies in such countries as India and Brazil to make generic versions of U.S.patented drugs, but stipulated that these companies were not to export those drugs.”124 Today,
generic drugs are used more widely as a result of a policy change in 2005. The policy required
the FDA to first approve the generic brands before their use in PEPFAR countries, though the
WHO had previously approved the generic versions.125 Before this change of policy, the money
used to purchase name-brand drugs, brought American pharmaceutical companies a billion dollar
business deal. At the same time, the number of individuals in PEPFAR nations needing
antiretroviral drugs was significantly reduced as a result of the higher costs.
The last of these arguments, the creation of negative externalities, stems from one of the
examples discussed earlier in the second argument. It is the notion that the large, targeted nature
of PEPFAR aid has a negative impact on the existing health structures in focus countries. In a
study done by Melissa Lee and Melina Platas Izama, data was compared from sub-Saharan
African states that received PEPFAR funds from those that did not. The study found that “[focus]
countries have seen a small slowing in the reduction of neonatal mortality, an indicator that
closely tracks with the performance of the public health system.”126 As previously mentioned,
this can cause states to become ever more dependent on development aid. A reason behind the
occurrence of this externality can be attributed to PEPFAR program’s need for personnel, known
to the receiving states as internal brain drain. Internal brain drain, detracts health workers from
other health sectors and draws them to higher paying programs, such as PEPFAR programs;
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“specific sectors that benefit from the influx of aid funds can offer higher wages, better
equipment, and increased resources that may pull the best and the brightest health workers and
other personnel away from other important yet underfunded health programs.”127

Conclusion. The Future of PEPFAR
Foucault argued that liberalism was such that “it was born with a market
governmentality, rather than the rights of man at its heart.” There has been a continuous effort to
tackle issues of poverty through monetizing society. In other words, a large portion of the
motivation behind development projects has been incentivized by economic and political means.
This market mentality has proven to be ineffectual in improving global public health. The results
of current U.S. development aid strategies, having been produced in a binary relationship with
economic strategy, have played into the understanding that by monetizing humans as capital,
public health issues cannot be factored into the same institution as state development aid.
The purpose of the case study of India was to provide a general outline of the evolution
of U.S. development aid directed towards a public health policy outcome. The amount of time
available for analysis in the India case study was pivotal as this similarity was the first parallel
drawn between PEPFAR and India as well as the fact that both cases were examples of U.S.
bilateral initiatives. The four paternalistic arguments drawn from the case study were proven to
be successful components in ensuring a democratically stable India and therefore a successful
U.S. development initiative. The success of the Indian initiative, in light of the Emergency
period, suggested that the four arguments were also a basis for understanding why U.S.
development aid had a consequential impact on the health of Indian citizens.
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The spanning time line of the history of the U.S.-India development aid relationship
creates an imprint, or fossilizes, the way in which U.S. interests were interpreted and applied to
its development aid strategies towards India. In using these four arguments pulled from this case
study, PEPFAR exemplifies the same issues with the paternalistic nature of U.S. development
aid as found in India. The future implications of PEPFAR on the public health of the citizens of
recipient countries are increasingly worrying as each of the previous chronological arguments
that occurred in India, are coming true in PEPFAR. What is unclear is what the externalities of
PEPFAR will be. The case study on India demonstrated that it was not until Indian democracy
trumped the threat of communism that the U.S. found its development aid initiatives to be
successful. In order to ensure this success though, the case study shows that forced sterilization
was the externality caused by the drive for the initiative’s success. While PEPFAR presents
different strategic goals for the U.S. than in India, given its current trajectory, there is strong
evidence to believe that a successful U.S. initiative will lead to poor public health outcomes for
the citizens of recipient nations. Allowing for a change in the public health trajectory of PEPFAR
states will depend on whether or not PEPFAR’s success can be perceived by both the United
States and PEPFAR receiving states.
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